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THIRD CIRCUIT'S NEW ROLE AS ACTIVIST COURT
ON IMMIGRATION ISSUES
GERALD SEIPP*

I.

INTRODUCTION

N Chain v. Attorney General,' the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
a political asylum claim that was denied by the Board of Immigration
Appeals ("BIA"). Judge Barry's introductory paragraph, borrowed from a
1997 Seventh Circuit decision, 2 set the tone for the opinion:
It is a hallmark of the American system ofjustice that anyone who
appears as a litigant in an American courtroom is treated with
dignity and respect. That expectation must be met regardless of
the citizenship of the parties or the nature of the litigation. In a
country built on the dreams and accomplishments of an immigrant population, a particularly severe wound is inflicted on that
principle when an immigration matter is not conducted in ac3
cord with the best of our tradition of courtesy and fairness.
In recent years, the Third Circuit has published several cases involving difficult, and sometimes controversial, immigration law issues. For
academics and immigration law practitioners concerned with constitutional due process and fundamental fairness to alien litigants, the recent

* Gerald Seipp is a 1972 graduate of the University of Michigan Law School
and a member of the New York and Florida bars. He practices immigration law
with the Law Office of Dilip Patel, P.A. in Clearwater, Florida. In addition to his 23
years of immigration practice, he taught the Immigration Law course for 15 years
at the State University of New York at Buffalo Law School. He has published many
articles on immigration law topics. He currently writes the federal court
summaries for Interpreter Releases, a Thomson West weekly publication which
reports on and analyzes immigration and nationality law issues. He is a member of
the American Immigration Lawyers Association and is listed in Best Lawyers in
America under Immigration Law.
1. 445 F.3d 683 (3d Cir. 2006).
2. See lliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that persons appearing before Immigration Judge are entitled to fundamental fairness).
3. Cham, 445 F.3d at 685.
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overall track record of the Third Circuit is an extremely refreshing development. Although the court's reviewing powers are substantially limited
by statutory review provisions, 4 and although the Supreme Court has
coined the Chevron5 deference principle pertaining to judicial review of
federal administration decisions, the Third Circuit has often taken an aggressive role in reviewing individual cases. Likewise, the court has not hesitated to pronounce its concerns regarding what it has perceived to be
systemic defects in the administrative decision making process.
This Article will survey several Third Circuit decisions announced
within the past two years. Examining these decisions by category of case, it
will discuss some common themes that pervade the court's mentality concerning its role as overseer of the bureaucratic administrative mechanism
for determining the fates and attendant rights of aliens ensnared in removal proceedings.
II.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S CONCERN FOR FAIRNESS AND AccuRAcy IN
ASYLUM ADJUDICATIONS

Cham involved a petition for review, filed by Abou Cham, a twentyseven-year-old citizen of The Gambia, who entered the United States with

his cousin's passport, and filed for political asylum and related refugee
relief. 6 He was eventually placed into removal proceedings, in which evidentiary hearings were conducted before Philadelphia Immigration Judge
("IJ") Donald Ferlise. Ferlise ruled that Mr. Cham's testimony was totally
unbelievable, that no portion of his testimony made sense, and went so far
4. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (2005) (addressing judicial review of orders of removal).
5. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984) (noting court may not substitute its construction of statutory provision for
reasonable interpretation made by agency administrator).
6. See Cham, 445 F.3d at 689-90 (presenting facts of case and Judge Ferlise's
denial of Cham's asylum application). Applications for asylum are governed by 8
U.S.C. § 1158, which was added to the INA pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006) (detailing asylum application process); 8 C.F.R. § 208
(2006) (detailing regulations for procedures for asylum and withholding of removal). A refugee is "any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality ...and who is unable or unwilling to return to... that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution. . . ." 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (42)
(defining refugee). Applications for asylum are also deemed to include applications for withholding of removal, also referred to as restriction on removal. See id.
§ 1231 (b) (3) (detailing restrictions on removal to country where alien's life would
be threatened). With certain statutory exceptions, withholding of removal is a
mandatory form of relief, if a clear probability of persecution is established. This is
a more exacting standard than required for asylum, which can be granted either
based on past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. However,
asylum is a discretionary benefit. The mere fact that an applicant satisfies the definition of "refugee" does not entitle the applicant to a grant of asylum. Many applicants for asylum and withholding also request relief under the United States
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment ("CAT"). The standards for CAT relief are set forth at 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.16-.18 (2006).
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as to find that Chain fabricated his entire case in chief, such as to render
his application for asylum to be frivolous. Chain filed an administrative
appeal with the BIA. 7 The BIA upheld the IJ's primary decision, but reversed the IJ's finding of frivolity as the record did not support the assertion that Cham's application was knowingly fabricated. The BIA faulted
the IJ for failing to provide a sufficient explanation for why he came to
that conclusion.
Given the formidable volume of review petitions filed in the federal
courts of appeals of late, a phenomenon which has been publicized in the
8
mainstream media and law journals alike, it would have been easy for the
Third Circuit to review the record and issue a boilerplate decision announcing that the administrative decision was supported by substantial evidence of record, fully confident that the BIA had adequately performed its
review function. 9 Despite this, the Chain court quoted substantial portions
from the Immigration Court hearing transcript, and severely chastised the
IJ for his conduct during Cham's hearing. Immediately following the paragraph quoted above, the court continued its opinion with the following
language:
The case now before us exemplifies the "severe wound .

.

. in-

flicted" when not a modicum of courtesy, of respect, or of any
pretense of fairness is extended to a petitioner and the case he so
valiantly attempted to present. Yet once again under the "bullying" nature of the immigration judge's questioning, a petitioner
was ground to bits.' 0
7. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2006) (defining jurisdiction and powers of Immigration Judges and single Board of Immigration Appeals, that are part of Executive
Office for Immigration Review, sub-agency of Department of Justice).
8. See, e.g., John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People ChallengingBoard of
Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Recent Surge
in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2005); Brian Donohue, Immigrants
Cite Judicial Discourtesy: Federal Appellate Panels Note 'DisturbingPattern', THE STARLEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 29, 2005 (stating 515% increase in appeals in past
four years); Pamela A. MacLean, Judges Blast Immigration Rulings, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
24, 2005, at SI (noting appellate courts are drowning in immigration appeals).
9. Although circuit courts often introduce reviews of asylum applications with
the observation that their review powers are circumscribed to determining whether
sufficient evidence supports the agency's decision, as opposed to conducting de
novo review, in the past two years, there have been a surprisingly high rate of grants
of petitions for review in asylum cases. In Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477 (3d Cir.
2001), the court stated that if the BIA's denial of asylum and withholding of deportation is supported by "substantial evidence" we must honor that conclusion. Id. at
483-84 (noting substantial evidence is more than mere scintilla). The substantial
evidence standard is deferential to the BIA's determination, and we will overturn it
only if the evidence in the record compels a conclusion contrary to that reached by
the BIA. See id. (describing substantial evidence requirement); see also He Chun
Chen v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 222 (3d Cir. 2004) (asserting "we are required to
sustain an adverse credibility determination 'unless . . . no reasonable person'
would have found the applicant credible").
10. Cham, 445 F.3d at 686.
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The court then cited prior opinions where Judge Ferlise's conduct was
similarly condemned.1 1
The court observed that "[o]n the day on which oral argument was
heard in [the Cham] case, a Deputy Attorney General appeared [before
the court,] at the court's request, to explain what, if any, procedures are
followed when repeated conduct of this nature is seen." 12 The court alluded to another relevant event that also occurred on the date of oral
argument. 13 On January 9, 2006, the Attorney General announced that
he would conduct "a comprehensive review of immigration courts." 14 He
circulated a memorandum to the Immigration Judges, expressing the
following:
I have watched with concern the reports of immigration judges
who fail to treat aliens appearing before them with appropriate
respect and consideration and who fail to produce the quality of
work that I expect from employees of the Department of justice.
While I remain convinced that most immigration judges ably and
professionally discharge their difficult duties, I believe there are
some whose conduct can apdy be described as intemperate or
15
even abusive and whose work must improve.
In granting the petition for review and remanding to the BIA for further proceedings, the court urged that on remand a different IJ should be
assigned. 16 The court clarified that it was taking no position on whether
17
or not the petitioner should ultimately prevail.
On the very same date that the Cham decision was announced, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided another asylum case, Shah
v. Attorney General,18 which also originated in Judge Ferlise's court. The
11. See Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 146, 155 (3d Cir. 2005) (criticizing Judge Ferlise's "bullying" and "brow beating" of young woman asylum applicant and describing his oral decision, later sanitized, as "crude and cruel"). In
Fiadjoe, the court considered that Judge Ferlise's "continuing hostility towards the
obviously distraught [petitioner] and his abusive treatment of her throughout the
hearing, reduced her to [an inability to respond]." Id. at 145; see also Sukwanputra
v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 638 (3d Cir. 2006) (criticizing Judge Ferlise's "intemperate and bias-laden remarks.., none of which had any basis in the facts introduced,
or the arguments made, at the hearing").
12. Cham, 445 F.3d at 686.
13. See id. (recognizing that Attorney General's announcement was not
coincidental).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 685-86. The Attorney General directed a similar memo, on the same
date, to the Board of Immigration Appeals. See 83 No. 3 Interpreter Releases 122
(Jan. 17, 2006) (ordering review of Immigration Courts).
16. See Cham, 445 F.3d at 694 (recognizing that assignment of IJis within province of Attorney General).
17. See id. (remanding for further proceedings consistent with opinion).
18. 446 F.3d 429 (3d Cir. 2006).
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court introduced its opinion with stark language: "Petitioner's father was
killed in cold blood, and the government concedes that he is dead."19
The petitioner in Shah was a citizen of Pakistan, whose persecution
claim was based upon her family's involvement in the Muttahida Qaumi
Movement ("MQM"), a political group representing the Mohajir (Urdu

speaking immigrants from India) population in Pakistan. 20 Again, the circuit court was highly critical of IJ's handling of the case. The court commented, "[a]lthough we don't expect an [IJ] to search for ways to sustain
an alien's testimony, neither do we expect the judge to... undermine and
belittle it."2 1 Reversing and remanding the BIA's decision affirming the
IJ's denial of asylum, the court of appeals urged that a different IJ be 22assigned if it is determined that an IJ's services are needed on remand.
The Third Circuit has not restricted its stern criticism to Judge Ferlise. In Wang v. Attorney Genera423 the court granted review to an applicant
from the People's Republic of China whose asylum claim was predicated
upon involuntary sterilization of his wife. 24 The court devoted a considerable portion of its opinion to critiquing IJ Garcy's conduct during the
hearing. The hearing transcript was interspersed with intemperate remarks by the IJ, who demonstrated her personal bias against the applicant.
She attacked the applicant's motivation and morality. She accused him of
being selfish for not paying a fine imposed upon his parents. She called
Mr. Wang a "horrible father," and stated that she was embarrassed to have
him in the courtroom. 25 The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision in a one-paragraph opinion.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the IJ's adverse credibility findings could not be upheld because of the "pervasive influence of
[her] unduly harsh character judgments." 2 6 The court also referred to
previous decisions in which it had already admonished IJ's for their inappropriate conduct and defective inferential reasoning. 2 7 The court expressed its frustration with the magnitude of the problem, noting that
"[t]ime and time again, we have cautioned immigration judges against
making intemperate or humiliating remarks during immigration proceedings." 28 The court noted that it had to admonish immigration judges
"who failed to treat the asylum applicants in their court with the appropri19. Id. at 430.
20. See id. at 431 (presenting facts of case).
21. Id. at 437.
22. See id. (remanding for further proceedings consistent with this opinion);
see also Marisa Taylor, ImmigrationJudges Under Scrutiny, MiAmi HERAL-D, July 5, 2006,
at 9A (claiming Judge Ferlise has since been relieved of his duties).
23. 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005).
24. See id. at 261-62 (detailing facts in case).
25. See id. at 265 (recounting oral opinion of Immigration Judge).
26. Id. at 270.
27. See id. at 267-68 (noting pattern of misconduct by Immigration Judge).
28. Id. at 267.
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ate respect and consideration" three times in 2005.29 By way of example,
the court referred to Zhang v. Gonzales,30 in which Circuit Judge McKee
"expressed his concerns about an IJ's apparent 'search for ways to undermine and belittle' the alien's testimony, and the possibility that the IJ's
decision 'was influenced by his view of Zhang's parenting."'31 The court
also alluded to several similar decisions from other circuits as revealing
that "[a] disturbing pattern of IJ misconduct has emerged notwithstanding the fact that some of our sister circuits have repeatedly echoed our
concerns."

32

The rather dramatic decisions in cases such as Cham, Shah and Wang
have attracted attention in both the mainstream media and in law journals. One article showcased the Shah and Cham cases as examples of IJ
decisions that circuit courts found troubling.3 3 The article noted that
Judge Ferlise was removed from the bench in May and cited statistics revealing a seven-fold spike in appeals of immigration cases in the past four
years.3 4 The article referenced the streamlining process that the BIA implemented in 2002 and the Attorney General's January 9, 2006
35
Memorandum.
A 2006 Harvard Law Review Note discusses the Wang case alongside

Benslimane v. Gonzales,36 a highly publicized Seventh Circuit decision by
Judge Posner. 3 7 The Note claims "U.S. immigration courts are in crisis"
and, "[a] s the most visible sign of the emergency, appeals of immigration
cases have swollen in the past five years from three percent to eighteen
percent of all federal appeals." 38 The Note refers to the Third Circuit's
Wang case, in which Judge Fuentes condemned the "disturbing pattern of
[immigration judge] misconduct," and the "extraordinarily abusive" immigration judge, who ordered an "asylum seeker deported to a country

where she had been held as a sex slave and faced the possibility of continued slavery and rape."3 9 The article also uses the Third Circuit's
29. See Wang v. Attorney Gen., 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
30. 405 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
31. Wang, 423 F.3d at 267.
32. Id. at 268.
33. See Taylor, supra note 22, at 9A (noting decisions by immigration judges
have come under intense scrutiny).
34. See id. (noting that 1600 appeals were filed in 2001 compared to 12,800 in
2005).
35. See id. (indicating Justice Department has begun to take steps to address
problems).
36. 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005).
37. See generally Recent Case, Immigration Law-Administration Adjudication-Third
and Seventh Circuits Condemn Pattern of Error in Immigration Courts, 119 HARV. L. REV.
2596 (2006).
38. Id. at 2596.
39. Id. at 2597 (quoting Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen., 411 F.3d 135, 154 (3d Cir.

2005)).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss5/1
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Sukwanputra v. Gonzales4°' case as an example of an IJ's derogation of his
41
responsibility of neutrality and impartiality.
On July 31, 2006, the mainstream media reported on a study con42
ducted by Transactional Records Access Center at Syracuse University.
This study documented the great disparity in the rate at which individual
immigration judges decline asylum applications. The study reported that
denial rates for the 208judges nationwide ranged from a low of 10% to a
high of 98%.4 3 The New York Times, summarizing the Report, noted that,
from 2000 to 2005, a particular Miami IJ denied 96.7% of the asylum cases
before him in which the petitioner had a lawyer, whereas a New York
judge denied asylum in just 9.8% of the cases before her. The article observed that the Third Circuit had been repeatedly forced to rebuke immigration judges for "intemperate and humiliating remarks." 44 The article
also refers to Judge Posner's November comment (without specifically citing the Benslimane case) for the proposition that the handling of asylum
cases by immigration judges had "fallen below the minimum standards of
45
legal justice."
On July 31, 2006, the Miami Herald reported on the Syracuse study,
noting that its findings directly challenged the mission statement of the
Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR"), to the effect that the
U.S. government is "committed to providing fair, expeditious and uniform
application of the nation's immigration laws in all cases." 46 The media
attention to this phenomenon of dramatically inconsistent and bizarre decision making by the immigration administrative tribunals is mostly attributable to the scathing criticism by the circuit courts in selected decisions.
The Third Circuit and the Seventh Circuit have been at the forefront in
exposing this serious problem, which adversely reflects on this country's
treatment of foreign persons seeking justice in this land.
The sheer volume of cases reaching the courts of appeals in recent
years is undoubtedly a direct result of the abdication of quality administrative review by the BIA, following Attorney General John Ashcroft's soundly
40. 434 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2006).
41. See Recent Case, supra note 37, at 2597-98 (reciting judge's remarks to
asylum seeker).
42. See TRAC, Syracusc University, Judges Show Disparties in Denying Asylum
(July 31, 2006), http://www.trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160/ (analyzing
how asylum requests had been handled).
43. See id. (detailing denial rates).
44. See Rachel L. Swarns, Study Finds Disparitiesin Judges' Asylum Rulings, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 2006, at A15 (noting disturbing pattern in cases from around
country).
45. See Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasizing concern with effective enforcement of immigration laws).
46. See U.S. Dep't ofJustice Executive Office for Immigration Review, http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/responsibilities.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2006) (stating office's responsibilities).
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criticized initiative to streamline the Board's review process. 47 Since the
program was launched, practitioners have been chagrined with the receipt
of cursory BIA decisions, suggesting that the single Board member summary orders are issued without any careful review of the record or the
briefs submitted by the parties. Immigration Judge Marks-the head of
the Immigration Judges' Organization-has publicly lamented the fact
48
that the Board has abandoned its previous role of polishing IJdecisions.
Fortunately, many of the circuit courts have sought to correct bad decisions and to comment on the pervasive problem.
In the celebrated case of Lusingo v. Gonzales,49 the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals even faulted the Department of Justice for its litigation posture. 50 Petitioner Fikiri Lusingo was a sixteen-year-old who came to the
United States on a visitor's visa with a group from his native Tanzania to
attend an international Boy Scout Jamboree. 51 He and two other scouts
decided to venture away from the regular program, presumably to experience other aspects of U.S. culture. 52 When they learned, through the media, that concern had been expressed about their disappearance, they
reported to a police station in Maryland and were then transferred to the
INS. 53 Deportation proceedings followed. Lusingo applied for asylum,
claiming that he feared retribution by his country for his extracurricular
activities in the United States.5 4 Prior to his apprehension, he unknowingly launched a "media frenzy" while people searched for him. 55 The
American media reported stories describing how poorly the Tanzanian
government treated street children and detailing the deplorable conditions in Tanzanian prisons. 56 While Lusingo presented persuasive evi47. See8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) (2006) (detailing Case Management System established to screen all cases and manage BIA's caseload). Every circuit to decide the
issue has upheld the validity of the regulations. The Third Circuitjoined the Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits in upholding the regulations against a
due process attack. See Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (listing
cases by other circuit courts upholding regulations).
48. See Howard Mintz, AppeaLs Board Widens Barrier to Immigration (Sept. 19,
2005), http://www.alipac.us/ftopic-10416-next.html (last visited September 29,
2006) (noting preference for strong appeals board reviewing immigration judges'
work). Judge Marks commented, "if we make a mistake, we could be sending
someone home to die." Id. In the same article, U.S Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren,
a member of the House Judiciary sub-committee on Immigration and Border Security, was quoted as saying: "Bad mistakes are being made." Id.
49. 420 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005).
50. See id. at 201 (criticizing arguments Attorney General made in its brief).
51. See id. at 195 (detailing background of case).
52. See id. (noting that they went to home of relative of one of boys).
53. See id. (recounting factual background).
54. See id. (noting Lusingo feared persecution).
55. See id. at 201 (commenting that media coverage included unflattering information about Tanzanian government).
56. See id. (stating facts of case).
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dence to substantiate his claims, the IJ denied the application and the BLA
affirmed.

57

The Third Circuit concluded that the BIA's reasoning with respect to
the evidence was flawed. 58 The court rejected the Attorney General's argument that the absence of Tanzanian newspaper articles and editorials
on the Lusingo situation undermined the petitioner's claim, noting that
59
the court had previously rejected similar poorly-reasoned arguments.
Furthermore, the court also rejected the government's contention that
the Tanzanian Ambassador's assurance that the petitioner had nothing to
fear discredited the asylum application.6" The court characterized the
61
government's arguments as "myopic."
Interestingly, Lusingo did not base his claim upon Tanzania's adverse
62
treatment of so called "street children." Indeed, in Escobar v. Gonzales,
the Third Circuit had concluded that street children do not comprise a
"social group" within the definition of refugee so as to be accorded eligi63
bility for asylum.
At the Immigration Judges' training conference in August, 2006, the
Attorney General ordered the Department ofJustice to implement twentytwo "new measures to enhance the performance of Immigration Courts"
and the BIA. 64 These measures include: conducting IJperformance evaluations; standardizing complaint procedures; requiring new IJs and BIA
members to pass an immigration law exam; increasing the BIA by four new
members; and adjusting the BIA's streamlining practices to encourage a
proliferation of one-member written opinions addressing poor or intemperate IJdecisions that reach the correct result but would benefit from
discussion or clarification.
A remarkable example of the Third Circuit's penchant for addressing
systemic issues with the asylum adjudication process is its decision in Berishaj v. Ashcroft. 65 This case involved an asylum review claim filed by an
ethnic Albanian from Montenegro (part of greater Serbia). 66 The court
57. See id. at 199 (same).
58. See id. at 200 (declaring holding).
59. See id. (same).
60. See id. at 201 (same).
61. See id. (same).

62. 417 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 2005).
63. See id. at 364 (announcing holding in case involving Honduran street
children).
64. See Attorney GeneralAlberto R. Gonzales Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts
and Board of Immigration Appeals, DEP'T oFJUsTICE, http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/
2006/August/06_ag_520.html.

65. 378 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing IJ's
finding that applicant was
not credible and criticizing "disturbing trend" of "grossly out-of-date" administrative records).
66. See id. at 316-17 (discussing facts of case).
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
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reversed the IJ's adverse credibility findings and the reliance on changed
67
country conditions as justification for denying the asylum application.
The court devoted several pages of its decision to commentary on the
difficulties presented by stale administrative records. 68

The court ob-

served that, in many of the asylum cases going before the court, the relevant facts related back several years to when the case was initially in the
immigration court. In cases where contemporary conditions in the alien
petitioner's country were relevant, the court was called upon to review a
record, including out-dated written Human Rights reports, which, in many
situations, were not indicative of current conditions in the particular country. The court specifically requested the BIA to adopt a policy on the subject-an unusual reaching out by the judicial branch into matters over
69
which the executive branch has responsibility.
The court also alerted the legislative branch to this perceived systemic
problem, by sending copies of its decision to the House and Senate Judiciary Committee Chairs and their Counsels. Additionally, the court sent
copies to the Attorney General of the Civil Division and the Deputy Assistant in charge of the Office of Immigration Litigation ("OIL"), the Secretary and General Counsel of the Department of Homeland Security
("DHS") and to the Chair of the BIA. 70 The executive branch did not
ignore the Third Circuit's entreaty. After receiving a copy of the Court's
Berishaj decision, the Office of the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for OIL immediately started to consider how best to address the Court's concerns. Meetings and consultations followed with the
Executive Office for Immigration Review and the Department of Homeland Security. As a result, OIL directed all attorneys representing the government to consider whether the age and quality of the record counsels in
71
favor of a stipulated remand.
In another case, the Third Circuit refused to defer to the State Department's "allegedly" expert opinion. 7 2 In Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft,73 a case
involving an asylum claim filed by a citizen of Cameroon, the Third Circuit
held that reliance on a letter by the State Department's Director of the
Office of Country Reports and Asylum Affairs, which suggested that the
petitioner's supporting documents were forgeries, was improper. The
court concluded that the report was not valid, and therefore violated the
67. See id. at 317 (concluding that IJ's "rejection of Berishaj cannot stand").
68. See id. at 328-32 (confronting problem of stale records).
69. See id. at 331 ("We therefore call on the BIA to adopt-by opinion, regulation, or otherwise-policies that will avoid the Court of Appeals having to review
administrative records so out-of-date as to verge on meaningless.").
70. See id. at 331-32 (listing parties to whom opinion should be sent).
71. See Ambartsoumian v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 85, 94-96 (3d Cir. 2004) (including new OIL policy in Appendix to opinion).
72. See Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 411 (3d Cir. 2003) (criticizing
BIA for relying on "unreliable and untrustworthy" letter).
73. Id. at 405-08.
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alien petitioner's right to due process. The Ezeagwuna case has recently
74
been relied upon by the Second and Sixth Circuits.
III.

PROBLEMATIC REFUGEE RELATED ISSUES FOR
PROBLEMATIC APPLICANTS

The Third Circuit has authored some interesting (and potentially
leading) precedents in several cases involving applications for withholding
removal and/or relief under the Convention Against Torture. Because of
the aliens' criminal records, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")

relegated aliens to this lesser form of refugee protection. 7 5 The court has
evinced a concern for these aliens, notwithstanding their negative
qualities.
In Purveegiin v. Gonzales,76 a case involving a Mongolian petitioner
with what might impress many as a less than sympathetic situation, 7 7 the
court vindicated IJ Walter Durling's initial favorable ruling, granting CAT
relief to the alien petitioner. The government successfully appealed to the
BIA, which reversed the IJ's favorable ruling by way of a single Board member decision. The Third Circuit ruled that the Board violated its own reg-

ulation 78 in its reversal of a favorable IJ decision without consideration by
a three-member panel. 79 The court referred to the Attorney General's
2002 "streamlining" initiative, and cited from the announcement in the
Federal Register regarding the "Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management." 80
74. See Lin v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 459 F.3d 255, 268-69 (2d Cir. 2006); Alexandrov v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 395, 407 (6th Cir. 2006) (rejecting State Department
report from U.S. Embassy in Sofia, Bulgaria, which concluded that alien's documents were fraudulent). The Alexandrov court stated that the Third Circuit's
Ezeagwuna opinion was the leading case in the area for the proposition that the
Board cannot rely on troubling hearsay reports and hide behind the State Department letterhead. See id. at 405-07 (citing Ezeagwuna, 325 F.3d at 406, and noting
that documents in Alexandrov case were "even less reliable than the letter in
Ezeagwund').
75. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006) (precluding aliens with aggravated felony convictions from being granted asylum).
76. 448 F.3d 684 (3d Cir. 2006).
77. See id. at 685-86 (detailing factual history of case). After coming to the
United States to study, Mr. Purveegiin dropped out of school and was convicted of
petty larceny, criminal impersonation and sexual abuse. Id.
78. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e) (6) (2006) (listing requirements for cases to be
assigned to three-member panel).
79. See Purveegiin, 448 F.3d at 685 (ruling that Board had "erred ... procedurally in refusing to refer the case to a three-member panel for resolution").
80. See id. at 687 (citing 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,885 (Aug. 26, 2002)) ("The
Department believes that the Board's experience with the streamlining initiative
has proven that fears of procedural failures or substantive errors being overlooked
are not well founded.").
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In Alaka v. Gonzales,8 1 the court ruled that for withholding of removal
purposes, 82 a "particularly serious offense" such as to disqualify the applicant from relief must be an aggravated felony. 8 3 The court identified this
matter as an issue of first impression, and apparently is the only circuit
court to have rendered such a conclusion. The court ruled in the particular case that the alien petitioner's band fraud conviction did not qualify as
an aggravated felony because the loss to the victim did not exceed
$10,000.84

IV.

CRIMINAL ALIEN ISSUES

Many of the cases presented to the circuit courts involve aliens subject
to removal for a myriad of criminal activity. Many of the alien petitioners
are actually lawful permanent residents of the United States. Historically,
the immigration laws have been harsh as applied to aliens with significant
criminal convictions. The Third Circuit has issued numerous decisions
construing various aspects of the legal provisions in this sub-category of
immigration law, involving the so-called "criminal alien."
A.

Aggravated Felony Cases

Aliens convicted of aggravated felonies 8 5 are subject to removal and
have extremely limited relief options. Unfortunately, for our alien population, the INA definitional section contains a long list of enumerated felonies, which qualify as "aggravated." Another unfortunate reality is that a
crime need not even be classified as a felony to constitute an "aggravated
felony" under U.S. immigration law. In United States v. Graham,86 a 1999
decision, the Third Circuit reluctantly acknowledged that the plain read81. 456 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 2006) (considering whether offense must be
"aggravated felony" to qualify as "particularly serious").
82. See Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b) (3) (B) (ii), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b) (3) (B) (ii) (2006) (precluding grant that withholds removal if Attorney
General decides that, "the alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime is a danger to the community of the United States").
The statute goes on to read that if "an alien [is] convicted of an aggravated felony
(or felonies) for which the alien has been sentenced to an aggregate term of at
least 5 years of imprisonment" this absolutely qualifies the crime as "particularly
serious." See id. § 1231(b) (3) (B) (ii) (discussing "particularly serious" crime).
83. See8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (43) (2006) (defining term "aggravated felony"). See
Alaka, 456 F.3d at 108 (granting petition to withhold removal claim).
84. See id. at 108 (granting petition to withhold removal claim).
85. The numerous aggravated felonies are defined at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a) (43) (A)-(U) (2006). Since 1988, when this term first became a part of
U.S. immigration law, Congress has periodically expanded and amended the list.
Aliens convicted of an aggravated felony are subject to deportation under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a) (2) (A) (iii) (2006). Several relief avenues under other provisions of the
INA are specifically barred for aggravated felons. See, e.g., id. § 1158(b) (2) (B) (i)
(asylum); id. § 1229(b)(a)(3), 1229(b)(1)(C) (cancellation of removal); id.
§ 1229(c) (a) (1) (voluntary departure).
86. 169 F.3d 787 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 845 (1999).
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ing of the statute required it to agree that a state misdemeanor petty larceny conviction, for which the alien was sentenced to a term of one year of
imprisonment, was properly classified as an aggravated felony.8 7 The
court directed its clerk to send copies of the court's opinion to the Assistant Attorney in charge of the Criminal Division, and the ranking majority
and minority members and their counsels of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Unfortunately, in the seven years since Graham,Congress
has not accepted the court's invitation.
In recent months, the Third Circuit has addressed other recurring
issues involved in determining whether particular offenses come within
the ambit of the aggravated felony definition. In Stubbs v. Attorney General,88 the court concluded that the petitioner's New Jersey conviction for
endangering the welfare of children was not "sexual abuse of a minor"
under the aggravated felony definition. 89 Although Mr. Stubbs was
charged with sexual misconduct such as to debauch the morals of a child
under sixteen, the criminal record did not include any details of his offense. The court explained that the New Jersey Statute was divisible, and
included conduct that merely involved neglect. The court observed that a
conviction could lie under the statute for willfully failing to provide proper
and sufficient food and this could hardly constitute "sexual abuse." Referring to the Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. United States,90 the court
explained, that in reviewing a conviction under the "categorical approach," consideration of the particular facts underlying the conviction
was not permissible. 9 1 The court agreed with the BIA that Stubbs had
been convicted under the prong of the statute involving sexual conduct,
which would impair or debauch the morals of a child. However, the court
found it significant that there was no claim that the petitioner engaged in
sexual conduct with the child, and therefore, an essential element of the
federal definition of the crime, 9 2 as adopted in a BIA precedent deci87. See id. at 788 ("We conclude that Congress was sufficiently clear in its intent to include certain crimes with one-year sentences in the definition of 'aggravated felony.'"). The INA provides that a theft offense "for which the term of
imprisonment at least one year [sic]" is an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C.
§ I101 (a) (43) (G) (2006) (defining one type of aggravated felony). Despite the
apparent scrivener's error in leaving out "is," the clear reading of the statute leaves
little room to argue that Congress really meant for the punishment to be "more
than one year," such as to make the provision consistent with the normal understanding of the demarcation between felonies and misdemeanors. See Graham, 169
F.3d at 790 (discussing scrivener's error).
88. 452 F.3d 251 (3d Cir. 2006).
89. See id. at 252 (concluding conviction for "endangering welfare of children" under New Jersey statute is not "sexual abuse of a minor"). The INA specifies that "murder, rape, [and] sexual abuse of a minor" are aggravated felonies. See
8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(A) (2006) (defining aggravated felony).
90. 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
91. See Stubbs, 452 F.3d at 253-54 (discussing "categorical approach").
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a) (8) (2000) ("[T]he term 'sexual abuse' includes
the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child
to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit conduct or the
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sion, 93 was lacking. Accordingly, the court vacated the Board's removal
order and remanded the case for further proceedings.
The Stubbs case is an example of the almost infinite variety of scenarios, which can potentially come to the Courts of Appeals. The immigration statute itself penalizes many categories of criminal conduct, and, of
course, there are thousands of different federal and state criminal statutes,
not to mention criminal statutes from foreign jurisdictions that also penalize criminal conduct. It is often necessary for the courts to juxtapose the
immigration statute with the applicable criminal statute and then proceed
to analyze the actual findings by the criminal court, which is often not an
easy task in its own right.
Several recent decisions, however, demonstrate that the Third Circuit
has not hesitated to undertake this daunting task. Oyebanji v. GonzalesP4
held that in New Jersey, vehicular homicide is not an aggravated felony
crime of violence 9 5 because the statute of conviction embraces merely
reckless conduct. The Third Circuit held the alien defendant's six year jail
sentence to be irrelevant based on its appraisal of the statutory definition
6
of the crime and the facts surrounding the defendant's conviction.
In Popal v. Gonzales,9 7 the Third Circuit reversed the removal order
after recognizing that the Pennsylvania assault statute included recklessness as the minimum culpability necessary for conviction. According to
the court, the record of the conviction did not specify the defendant's
actual conduct or indicate intent to use force. 98 Further, in Tran v. Gonzales,9 9 the court ruled that a Pennsylvania conviction for "reckless burning
or exploding" did not categorically constitute a crime of violence under 8
rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of sexual exploitation of children, or
incest with children ..
").
93. See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 995 (BIA 1999) (finding "definition of sexual abuse in 18 U.S.C. § 3509(a)(8) [was] useful identification of the forms of sexual abuse").
94. 418 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005).
95. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(43)(F) (2006) (gleaning whether particular state
crime contains necessary "violence" element, courts to refer to federal definition
of "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2006). "Crime of violence" is defined
as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.
Id.
96. See Oyebanji, 418 F.3d at 262 (declining to consider person's actual conduct where person pled guilty).
97. 416 F.3d 249 (3d Cir. 2005).
98. See id. at 254 (noting "settled law" that statutory "crime of violence" must
consist of action "with an intent to use force").
99. 414 F.3d 464 (3d Cir. 2005). In Tran, the alien defendant was charged
with helping to cover up a murder by burning the body. See id. at 466 (describing
facts of conviction).
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U.S.C. § 16, as the federal statute mandated a specific intent to use force
and the Pennsylvania statute only required a mens rea of recklessness for
conviction.' 00 In Ng v. Attorney General,10 1 however, the court concluded
that an interstate commerce crime involving "murder-for-hire" was an aggravated felony crime of violence, thus upholding the defendant's removal
order. 10 2 The court stated that, while it was not required to extend deference to the BIA's conclusion, it nevertheless agreed with the BIA's ultimate holding under the "categorical approach."' 0 3 Similarly, the Third
Circuit, in lchuck v. Attorney General'0 4 held that a conviction under Pennsylvania law for diversion of ambulance services constituted an aggravated
felony of theft, because the state statute contained the necessary intent
element. 10 5 The court further contended that the criminal sentence of
home confinement constituted a sentence to imprisonment for a year or
longer such as to satisfy that element of the aggravated felony definition
for theft. 10 6 Ultimately, the court granted the petition for review of the
BIA's determination with regard to the denial of the petitioner's claim for
0 7
withholding of removal.
B.

Consideration of Post-Conviction Relief

Given the unyielding nature of our immigration laws for criminally
convicted aliens, a major strategy in addressing immigration removal cases
is to convince the criminal court to re-visit the criminal disposition. This
often takes the form of motions to withdraw guilty pleas through such
devices as coram nobis or habeas corpus petitions. If the alien defendant is
successful in securing an order, either vacating a conviction or otherwise
revising the plea to a disposition which is not within the ambit of the deportation laws, the next challenge is to convince the IJ or the BIA-depending on the stage of the removal case-that the new criminal court
order should be extended full faith and credit. 10 8
100. See id. at 469-72 (analyzing requirements of federal statute to determine
whether "reckless burning or exploding" is categorically crime of violence).
101. 436 F.3d 392 (3d Cir. 2006).
102. See id. at 397 (declaring holding of case).
103. See id. at 395-97 (following categorical approach and looking only to elements of statute, not defendant's actual intent).
104. 434 F.3d 618 (3d Cir. 2006).
105. See id. at 623 (focusing on term "knowingly" as requiring "proof that [defendant] was aware of the practical certainty that his acceptance of the ambulance
call would result in diversion of its benefits to someone not entitled to them").
106. See id. (concluding defendant's sentence was "a term of 'imprisonment'
in the broad sense intended by the INA").
107. Id. at 626 (noting defendant qualified for withholding of removal).
108. In In re Rodiguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1378 (BIA 2000) and In re
Adamiak, 23 I. & N. Dec. 878 (BIA 2006), the BIA ruled that a criminal court's
vacation of a criminal conviction based on a defect in the underlying criminal
proceeding is entitled to full faith and credit for immigration purposes. In In re
Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621 (BIA 2003), however, the Board refused to recognize a purported vacation of a criminal conviction by a Canadian court, based on
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Last year, in Pinho v. Gonzales,10 9 the Third Circuit similarly held that
a vacated criminal conviction could not serve as the basis for removal, despite the fact that the vacatur was the result of a settlement agreement.' 10
Mr. Pinho's case came before the Third Circuit as a result of his appeal
from the district court's denial of his application for adjustment of status
and its subsequent grant of summary judgment for the government. I1
Rejecting the government's argument that the petitioner and the criminal
court, with consent from the state attorney, had facilitated this disposition
in order for Mr. Pinho to achieve his immigration benefit, the Third Circuit found that Mr. Pinho predicated his motion to the criminal court on
the theory that his underlying conviction was based on a violation of his
12
constitutional right to counsel."
In a more recent case, Cruz v. Attorney General,'" 3 the Third Circuit
again addressed the issue of the treatment of an alleged vacated conviction for immigration purposes, although in a different procedural context.1 14 As a result of Mr. Cruz's guilty plea to a New Jersey "promoting
prostitution" offense-a "crime of moral turpitude" under the INA-an
its conclusion that this disposition was merely a device to insulate the alien from
the immigration consequences of his prior conviction. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals recently reversed the Board's Pickering decision. Pickering v. Gonzales,
454 F.3d 525 (6th Cir. 2006).
109. 432 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2005).
110. Id. at 215 (finding that decision to vacate was "based on a defect in the
underlying criminal proceedings").
111. Id. at 196-99 (discussing procedural history, including District Court's
holding). The DHS considered Mr. Pinho's application in light of his conviction
for possession of cocaine, a controlled substance offense. See id. at 197-98 (describing INS denial of adjustment). Prior to his application, a state court vacated his
conviction based upon a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. at 196-97
(explaining decision to vacate based on counsel's failure to inform petitioner of
Pre-Trial Intervention Program eligibility). Essentially, all the parties agreed to
allow Mr. Pinho to withdraw his prior guilty plea, substituting a new disposition
which enabled him to participate in a pre-trial intervention program and thus,
avoid a conviction. See id. at 197 (noting participation in PTI program and subsequent dismissal of charges).
112. See id. (focusing on ineffective assistance of counsel claim). In a recent
First Circuit decision, the court declined to follow the Third Circuit's analysis in
Pinho. See Rumierz v. Gonzales, 456 F.3d 31, 42 (1st Cir. 2006) ("Pinho does not say
that the BIA must accept every stipulation which leads to vacating a conviction,
whatever the circumstances."). The First Circuit refused to recognize a state
court's stipulation as to a vacated conviction, noting that the vacated conviction
could have been motivated by any number of reasons; the alien in that case did not
show that the conviction was based upon any underlying defect in the criminal
proceeding. See id. at 42 (upholding BIA's determination regarding validity of conviction for immigration purposes). Judge Lipez wrote a long and thoughtful dissent, relying on the "persuasive analysis" in the Pinho case. See id. at 50-52 (Lipez,
J., dissenting) (urging that BIA decision be vacated and case remanded for termination of removal proceedings).
113. 452 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2006).
114. See id. at 242 (recognizing difficult issue of vacated convictions' role in
immigration proceedings).
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immigration judge had ordered him removed from the United States." 15
Choosing not to decide the ultimate issue of whether the conviction was
adequately vacated for immigration purposes, the Third Circuit instead
took the unusual step of remanding the case to the BIA for reconsideration of its prior decision and not to sua sponte reopen Mr. Cruz's proceedings, in spite of the untimeliness of Mr. Cruz's motion.' 16
The court, in assessing its jurisdictional powers, noted that it was confronted with a "jurisdictional conundrum," because of its inability to ascertain whether the BIA declined to exercise its sua sponte authority on a
reviewable or nonreviewable basis.' 17 The Third Circuit concluded that
the BIA should not have ignored the question of whether the petitioner
was still removable by virtue of his vacated conviction.' 18 Furthermore,
the court noted that it was aware of ten unpublished BIA decisions that
exercised sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings where a conviction
had been vacated after the original BIA order. 119 The court suggested
that, should the BIA determine on remand that the petitioner is no longer
convicted under the INA, it would be expected "to reopen [the] proceedings despite the untimeliness of [the] motion, as it has routinely done in
"
other cases . . . or at least explain logically its unwillingness to do so. 1120
IV.

CONCLUSION

The United States government's executive branch has recently
evinced a strong preference to operate without any interference by the
judicial branch. Congress has cooperated with the executive in enacting
what practitioners not so affectionately refer to as 'jurisdiction-stripping"
legislation.
Given the complexity of our immigration laws and the more than occasional lack of quality and consistency in the administrative adjudication
process, an alien's ability to petition the federal courts is an extremely
115. See id. at 243 (describing basis for removal).

116. See id. at 250 (ordering remand of matter for BIA review). Within certain exceptions, motions to reopen removal orders are required to be filed within
thirty days of the date of entry of the original order. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1229 (a) (c) (6) (B) (2006) (discussing motions to reconsider). The BIA had previously denied Cruz's motion as untimely, because, pursuant to the statute, it was
due on or before May 17, 2004, but was not filed until February 2005. See Cruz, 452
F.3d at 245 (addressing untimeliness issue).
117. See Cruz, 452 F.3d at 250 (examining issue of whether BIA decision not to
reopen sua sponte "implicated its unfettered discretion"). The court would have
had the power to review the issue of whether the alien was still considered convicted for immigration purposes, but at the same time, perhaps would not have
assumed jurisdiction over the discretionary decision on reopening itself. See id. at
246-49 (exploring issues of jurisdictional authority).
118. See id. at 242 (noting BIA's authority to review issue of vacated
conviction).
119. See id. at 246 n.3 (listing cases that BIA overlooked untimeliness of alien's
motion).
120. See id. at 250 (detailing expectations for BIA review on remand).
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salutary remedy, not only to be relieved of arbitrary and capricious decisions, but also to render the executive agencies to be more accountable.
Particularly in the area of asylum jurisprudence, the Third Circuit has not
only protected the critical rights of several individual alien litigants, but
has also motivated the Attorney General to work towards improving the
quality of decision-making in the executive adjudicative tribunals. Aggressive judicial review is a fundamental concept in our system of government,
premised on the checks and balances inherent in the three branches of
government.
In general, the Third Circuit deserves to be applauded for performing a strong and productive role as the third branch of government. Inevitably, advocates of a stronger executive branch will take issue with the
court's occasional forays, construing the incursions as encroaching on the
prerogatives of the executive branch. In any event, the Third Circuit
court's overall performance in grappling with the many controversial and
complex issues, which immigration litigation often generates, deserves
high marks for its dedication in assuring that the alien litigant has a meaningful day in court after filing a petition for review. The Third Circuit has
exemplified its own admonition in being a paragon of the American system of justice.
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